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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only issue that was presented before the Industrial 
Commission and this Court is whether or not the Industrial 
Commission correctly interpreted Rule 490-1-12(b) in determining 
when interest was due and payable to Broadbent. There is no issue 
of fact to be resolved by this Court because all facts are 
undisputed. Lastly, because the defendants made a few sporadic 
payments of temporary total disability does not relieve them of 
their obligation to pay interest on past due permanent partial 
disability payments. 
REPLY POINT I 
The Industrial Commission's erroneous 
interpretation of Rule 490-l-12(b) (Utah Admin. 
Code 1991) is a question of law. There is no 
question of fact in dispute. 
A. QUESTION OF LAW 
Defendants claim that there is a question of fact 
that still needs to be resolved. The facts are undisputed in this 
case. The only issue raised with the Industrial Commission and 
with this Court concerns the interpretation of Rule 490-1-12(b) and 
whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the proper date for the 
interest to begin accrual. (R. 147 Industrial Commission Order, 
Appendix A). Defendants are merely trying to "muddy the waters" by 
claiming an issue of fact exists. 
Defendants argue that the Commission's 
interpretation was correct. Notably absent from defendant's Brief 
is any analysis of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78. As noted in Mr. 
Broadbent's Appellate Brief that section states: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. Defendant's rely solely upon Rule 490-1-12(b). Defendant's 
claim that "Mr. Broadbent's condition was not fixed, according to 
Dr. Bender, as of late 1990, so the award of interest from 1991 
when his disability rating was confirmed by a medical panel, was in 
accordance with R490-1-12B.2." (Respondent's Brief p. 12). This 
is an amazing claim given the fact that defendant's were willing to 
pay Mr. Broadbent a settlement pursuant to Dr. Sorenson's 1987 
impairment rating. (R. 14) In one breath defendants are claiming 
that Broadbent was not stable and could not be paid PPD. Then in 
the next breath they claim that they made a settlement offer of 
full value to Broadbent. (Respondent's Brief P. 4, footnote 4). 
According to the defendant's, if Mr. Broadbent's condition had 
continued to worsen for the rest of his life, but he continued to 
work, they would never have had an obligation to pay permanent 
partial disability let alone interest on that amount! 
Furthermore, defendants do not address the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Crenshaw v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
712 P.2d 247 (Utah 1985). Defendants did not respond to this 
because they had free use of Mr. Broadbent's money. Clearly, this 
2 
is not what Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 had intended. Nor did the Utah 
Supreme Court intend such a situation to occur. Dr. Bender's 
report, that Mr. Broadbent had not yet stabilized as of 1990, 
merely justifies Mr. Broadbent's refusal to accept defendant's 
attempt to compromise this matter in 1987 for much less than he was 
entitled. The delay of payment is due to his medical condition. 
That certainly is not any fault of his. And as the Supreme Court 
stated in Crenshaw: 
Interest on each payment when due is not intended 
as a penalty or punishment for the refusal to 
pay. The interest is charged to the employer's 
use of someone else's money. The claimant is 
unable to make any use of the money and the value 
of the benefit is diminished when payment is 
delayed. Any such delay in payment inevitably 
results in the claimant subsidizing the 
employer's insurer. By Statute, interest must be 
paid on each benefit payment which comprises an 
award from the date the payment would have 
otherwise been due and payable. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 250. Mr. Broadbent did not have use of his money and the 
employer did. The Supreme Court clearly stated: "Any such delay in 
payment inevitably results in the claimant subsidizing the 
employer's insurer." Id. Broadbent was not able to make use of 
his money and defendant's insurance carrier was subsidized simply 
because Mr. Broadbent was employed, not paid temporary total 
disability. 
Because the Industrial Commission did not choose 
which of Broadbent's impairment rating to accept until 1991, it 
should not affect Broadbent's entitlement to interest when he had 
returned to work in 1983 and had his temporary total disability 
3 
payments terminated. Simply stated, defendants are trying to 
penalize Mr. Broadbent for not being medically stable. Defendants 
owed permanent partial disability payments to Broadbent the day the 
temporary total disability payments ended and interest should begin 
to accrue from that date on. 
Lastly, because Broadbent provides this Court with 
such a unique fact situation this Court can determine that the 
administrative rule is in conflict with the statute and can be 
disregarded by this Court. It is undisputed that defendants had 
terminated Broadbent's temporary total disability payments because 
he had returned to work. Broadbent's PPD payments were due and 
payable. Any other determination will simply allow insurance 
companies to prolong the payment of permanent partial disability by 
any means and have the use of an injured employee's benefits at no 
charge. Clearly, this is not what the statute nor the Supreme 
Court intended happen. Therefore, this Court can find that the 
Rule is in conflict with the statute and disregard it and order 
defendants to pay Broadbent interest on his past due permanent 
partial disability payments. 
B. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT 
Defendants argue that because Mr. Broadbent has 
multiple impairment ratings that his condition was not fixed and 
this creates a question of fact. (Respondent's Brief p. 14-15). 
This was never raised below and the Industrial Commission never 
addressed this issue. Defendants now raise this issue and cite Dr. 
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Bender7s statement, "In review of these extensive medical records, 
which cover the past eight years, it is apparent that Mr. Broadbent 
has a progressive problem which is undoubtedly more impaired at 
this time than several years ago." (R. 157) It is astounding that 
defendants are now using Dr. Bender's medical report to try and 
show that they are justified in not paying his benefits prior to 
the medical panel's determination. When Broadbent relied upon Dr. 
Bender's report in an attempt to settle this matter defendants 
flatly refused.1 It is hard to believe that defendants truly 
accept Dr. Bender's report, unless that statement can be twisted in 
their favor. 
In addition to the above, there is no question that 
Broadbent's condition has progressively deteriorated due to the 
Parkinson-like disease that has affected him since this accident. 
Because that symptom was found not to be related to the industrial 
accident no claim has been made on it. However, it is unclear from 
Dr. Bender's report if he is claiming that the deterioration of 
Broadbent's abilities was due to the Parkinson-like symptoms or his 
total condition. Dr. Bender included the Parkinson-like symptoms 
in his total impairment rating. Dr. Wirthlin clearly indicates 
that the Parkinson-like symptoms have caused a lot of problems and 
it has worsened since the accident. 
Broadbent offered to settle for Dr Bender's twenty-four percent impairment ratmg plus interest, mileage, md the cost of Dr Bender's examination 
Defendants try and make an issue of the fact that Mr Broadbent asked for interest, mileage, and the cost of Dr Bender's report (Respondent's Brief, p 5, 
footnote 5 ) If defendant had truly believed Dr Bender's report, this case would have never gone to a medical panel It would have simply gone to a hearing 
on the question of mtere.it, mileage, and the cost of Dr Bender's report 
5 
C. OCCASIONAL PAYMENT8 OF TTD DOES NOT RELIEVE DEFENDANTS OF 
THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO PAY INTEREST ON PAST DUE PPD. 
Lastly, defendants make the absurd claim that 
because they made a payment of temporary total disability as late 
as May 10, 19882 they are not required to pay interest on past due 
permanent partial disability. What defendants failed to clarify 
for this court is that Broadbent was only paid temporary total 
disability from August 14, 1986 through and including August 27, 
1986, February 17, 1987 through and including March 8, 1987, and 
apparently from March 14, 1988 through and including May 6, 1988. 
This is a total of 12.57 weeks. It was spread over three periods 
of time, the first more than three years after Broadbent had 
stopped receiving temporary total disability. Now they claim that 
these occasional payments somehow magically relieves them of their 
obligation to pay past due permanent partial disability. This is 
contrary to the statute, Supreme Court decisions, and Rule 490-1-
12(b) . Clearly the intent of the statute and the Rule is that when 
an injured employee is taken off temporary total disability, 
permanent partial disability should begin from that date. If he is 
still receiving permanent partial disability payments sometime 
later and requires additional medical attention that causes him to 
return to the temporary total disability then, obviously the 
The document in the records (R. 89) indicates that Mr. Broadbent was paid temporary total disability until May 6, 1988. This document appears to be a 
printout of a computer screen terminal produced on April 2, 1992. This document is difficult to interpret without some type of key for the symbols. Defendants 
claim that May 10, 1988 was the date that Mr. Broadbent's temporary total disability payments ended. However, on the right hand side of the document it 
appears that the temporary total disability payments where only paid until May 6, 1988. It is unclear as to what the numbers or the dates on the left hand side 
represent. On the preceding page in the records (R. 88) the numbers on the left hand side do not correspond at all with the dates that the temporary total 
disability was paid in the columns on the right. Nevertheless, defendants merely paid Mr. Broadbent temporary total disability for eighty-eight (88) days or 12.57 
weeks from the time that he was released to return to work on June 9, 1983 through and including approximately August 17, 1992 when defendants tendered 
the amount ordered by the Industrial Commission. 
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permanent partial disability payments would be suspended. However, 
when an injured employee, such as Broadbent, is injured, becomes 
stable, and has further medical attention, much later, requires 
brief payments of additional temporary total disability does not 
nullify the obligation to pay the prior permanent partial 
disability payments. Defendants claim that interest doesn't accrue 
until after the last temporary total disability payment is simply 
unfounded. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue before this court is whether or not 
the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted Rule 490-1-12(b). 
That is a question of law. Because Broadbent was cleared to return 
on June 10, 1983, his temporary total disability payments ended on 
that date. Consequently, his permanent partial disability payments 
became due at that time, as well. Mr. Broadbent has received 
numerous impairment ratings simply because the doctors have 
disagreed concerning his medical condition. Nevertheless, an 
impairment rating was first given on September 5, 1984. If a 
doctor can give an impairment rating, whether it is correct or not, 
Broadbent's impairment could be determined on that date. 
Defendants then used Dr. Bender's statement that 
Broadbent was more impaired at the time of that examination than he 
was several years ago to justify their nonpayment of interest. 
This is a remarkable position to take, since defendants flatly 
refused to accept Dr. Bender's report prior. Furthermore, it is 
7 
unclear as to whether Dr. Bender is referring to the deterioration 
of Broadbent's condition as being caused by the industrial related 
injury or the Parkinson-like symptoms Broadbent has. Consequently, 
defendants claim of a question of fact is simply unfounded. 
Because defendants have had the use of Broadbent's 
money for a significant amount of time, this court must order that 
they pay interest from that amount. Broadbent was taken off 
temporary total disability on June 10, 1983, consequently his 
permanent partial disability payments should begin on that date. 
In the alternative, he received his first impairment rating on 
April 23, 1984. Clearly, his medical condition could be determined 
at that date. Therefore, Defendant should be ordered to pay 
interest from that date. 
DATED this 24th day of November, 1992. 
ROBERT B7 S«E5^ \*S 
Attorneys for i^ ppellants 
Ey#ENE C. MILLER', JR. / ' 
Attorneys for Appellants / 
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APPENDIX A 
ORDER 
JUN 0 1 1992 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Fred Broadbent, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
* 
Tolboe Construction and/or * 
Industrial Indemnity, * 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
IN PART 
Case No. 90000918 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for 
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe 
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned 
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and 
Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or 
Industrial Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned 
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's 
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second 
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed. 
The above named respondents submitted their response to 
applicant's first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date 
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the 
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to 
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to 
respondent's Motion for Review. Respondents provided a further 
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6, 
1992. 
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for 
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the 
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be 
considered untimely. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended 
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and 
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we 
will consider the responses. 
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an 
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and 
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total 
disability benefits (TTD). The respondents claim that the 
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial 
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD 
FRED BROADBENT 
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rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1937. The applicant filed 
an application for hearing in October 1990. 
In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied 
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any 
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and 
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated 
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did 
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the 
statute. 
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among 
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this 
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded 
the applicant a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the 
medical panel impairment rating of 23 percent, and ordered that the 
applicant's compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of 
eight percent from December 23, 1991. 
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated 
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the 
proper date for the interest to begin accrual. The applicant 
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the 
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated. 
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides 
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest 
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the 
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment 
rating of 2 0 percent. 
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering 
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since 
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first 
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the 
award of interest on workers compensation benefits: 
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker 
disability is legislation for the public wel-
fare. It is also clear that the statute pro-
viding for interest on unpaid benefits was a 
legislative attempt to remedy a sericus social 
problem: the depreciation of the value of bene-
fits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly 
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a 
final determination of eligibility and an award 
FRED BROADBENT 
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was made. 
Marshall v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985), 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall in-
clude interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
1953 as amended 1981. 
Further, our rules state that: 
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits 
shall become "due and payable11 (as used in Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows: 
* * * 
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be 
due and payable on the next day follow-
ing the termination of a temporary total 
disability. However, where the condition 
is not fixed for rating purposes, the in-
terest shall commence from the date the 
permanent partial impairment can be medi-
cally determined. 
Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991). 
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or 
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the 
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different 
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some 
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled 
to such payments. 
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of 
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ. 
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992 
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his 
travel. The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the 
respondents' reply to applicant's motion argues that the Order did 
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the 
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the 
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various 
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant 
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ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will 
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our 
decision. 
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16, 
192 provides that: 
An employee who, based upon his/her physi-
cian's advice, requires hospital, medical, 
surgical, or consultant services for in-
juries arising out of and in the course of 
employment and who is authorized by the 
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial 
Commission to obtain such services from a 
physician and or hospital shall be entitled 
to [certain reimbursements]. 
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992). 
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel 
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within 
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code 
1992) . Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are 
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed 
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit 
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized 
care. 
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he 
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application 
before the effective date of the new rule. Therefore, the 
requirement that the applicant submit his reiquests for travel 
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care 
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other 
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were 
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992. 
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on 
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are 
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However, 
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show 
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required 
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing 
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of 
treatment and return. 
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not 
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee 
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the 
reimbursement. Preferably this should be discussed, among such 
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when 
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion 
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over 
mileage as presented in this case. 
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or 
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case. The 
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts 
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this 
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ. 
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of 
this issue. 
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and 
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year 
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility 
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the 
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It 
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which 
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late 
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the 
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about 
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of 
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we 
will approve the amounts claimed. 
The remaining issue to be discussed, and which is the only 
issue raised by the respondents in their Motion for Review is 
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act prohibits the Commission from making an award to the applicant 
of permanent partial disability after eight years from the date of 
applicant's injury. 
The statute in question reads: 
The Commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to an em-
ployee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of the in-
jury and who files an application for such 
purpose prior to the expiration of such 
eight-year period. 
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981). 
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the 
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering the 
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to the 
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument, the 
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking the 
Commission's award was caused by the applicant. 
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that the Commission is 
not required to make such award within the €iight year period, 
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to 
those situations where the applicant's condition has not 
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be 
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be 
provided until stabilization. Under these circumstances, such 
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration 
of the eight year period. 
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application 
before the eight year period. 
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision. 
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to 
uphold the findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten 
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the 
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement 
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on 
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of 
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
1992. Certified this ^ 9 ^ day of }T)^ 
ATTEST: L-j~ 
Patricia O. ^ sn^y 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the 
DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S 
MOTIONS FOP REVIEWW IN PART on Fred Broadbent, Case No. 90000918 on 
May 1992 to the following: 
^ 
Stuart L. Poelman, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Esq. 
SYKES £ VILOS, P.C. 
311 South State Street, #2 4 0 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
Presiding Judge Allen 
